

ON THE BUDDHIST SYLLOGISM

It is well known that Dignāga eliminated from the 'five-membered sentence' (*pañcāvayava-vākya*) of the Nyāya system the last two members, viz., the 'Application' (*upanaya*) and the 'Conclusion' (*nigamana*)¹ and that Dharmakīrti, in turn, reduced the 'syllogism' to two members : the statement of the Invariable Concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the 'reason' (*hetu*) and the 'object to be established' (*sādhya*), and the statement of the reason's being a property of the subject (*pakṣadharmatā*).

Now the Aristotelian bias has long since vitiated the study of Indian logic. Much time and energy have been wasted in attempts to reduce Indian 'syllogism' to the Aristotelian pattern. Even those scholars who have perceived the discrepancy between the two patterns have not been always immune from this bias.

For one thing, psychological considerations were never completely banished from the Indian syllogism, as from Indian logic in general. Dignāga's distinction between 'inference for oneself' (*svārthānumāna*) and 'inference for others' (*parārthānumāna*) should not create illusion, inasmuch as it is only metaphorically that the latter is called an 'inference',² the real inference being the former. In this context alone can one understand the sense of Dignāga's and, later, Dharmakīrt's reduction. As Dignāga himself states:

*svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā/
pakṣadharmatva-saṃbandha-sādh yokter anyavarjanam³//*

It was the question of 'comprehension' or 'non-comprehension' on the part of the others which prevailed with Dharmakīrti as well. Not only did he reduce the 'syllogism' to two members but also he did not see any fixed order of these members. Words, according to Dharmakīrti, have no probative power; they only *indicate* things which prove other things. It is in this indirect way that the statement of the 'reason' 'provided with the three characters' (*trirūpa*) proves.⁴ The order of the members of the 'syllogism' is, therefore, indifferent. Either of the two members – the statement of the Invariable Concomitance (implying both the 'positive concomitance' and the 'negative concomitance' – the last two characters), and the statement of the 'fact of being a property of the subject' (the first character) – can be placed first; for, whichever the order of the members, the 'syllogism' leads to the understanding of the thing to be proved.⁵

¹ Actually this reduction goes back to Vasubandhu : see E. Frauwallner, 'Vasubandhu's Vādaividhiḥ', in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie* I (1957), pp. 118-9, with n. 21.

² *kāraṇe kāryopacārāt : Dharmakīrti, Nyāyabindu* III, 2.

³ *Pramāṇasamuccaya* IV, 6, in Masaaki Hattori, 'Fragments of Pramāṇasamuccaya': *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (Tokyo) VII, 1 (December 1958), p. 69. See also Uddyotkara, *Nyāyavārttika* I, 1, 39 (Thakur, *Nyāyadarśana*, p. 575), where the latter half of the verse is cited. – Cf. Dharmakīrti, *Hetubindu* (ed. E. Steinkellner, Wien 1967 : Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 252, Band 2, Abhandlung. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 4), p. 41 (6*).

⁴ *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 15-17. See also Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1431 with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* (E. Krishnamacharya's edition, where, instead of *asakta*°, *asakta*° should be read; in the first citation in the *Pañjikā*, instead of *cakrur*, read *vaktur*; instead of *prāpaṇam*, read *pramāṇam* [*Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 16]. See also A. Kunst, *Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha*, Krakow 1939, p. 63).

⁵ *tasya samarthanam sādhyena vyāptiṃ prasādhyā dharmiṇi bhāvasādhanam yathā 'yat sat kṛtakaṃ vā tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ, san kṛtako vā śabdaḥ' iti. atrāpi na kaścit kramaniyamah. iṣṭārthasiddher ubhayatrāviśeṣāt; yasmād dharmiṇi prāk sattvaṃ prasādhyā paścād api vyāptiḥ prasādhyata eva : yathā 'san śabdaḥ kṛtako vā, yaś caivaṃ sa sarvo, nityaḥ, yathā ghaṭādiḥ' iti : Vādanyāya* (Swami Dwarikadas Shastri's edition, Varanasi 1972), pp. 7-8. Cf.

This conception was fully exploited by Ratnākaraśānti in establishing ‘internal concomitance’ (*antarvyāpti*), that is the concomitance that is apprehended, not in an external example, but in the subject of the inference itself.⁶ Now, if the concomitance between the ‘reason’ and the ‘object to be established’ is apprehended in the subject of the inference itself, then the statement of the fact of being a property of the subject becomes redundant in a ‘syllogism’ starting with the statement of the Invariable Concomitance : the apprehension of the reason’s being a property of the subject is, indeed, a pre-condition of the apprehension of the Invariable Concomitance – in the theory of ‘internal concomitance’. Against this objection, Ratnākaraśānti replies that there is no fixed order in this respect. Or, rather, the order of the members of the ‘syllogism’ is the same as that in which the ‘inference for oneself’ takes place. Just as in the theory of ‘external concomitance’ (*bahirvyāpti*), the ‘reason’ is first apprehended in the subject of the inference and then the Invariable Concomitance is remembered, so also in the theory of ‘internal concomitance’, the ‘reason’ is first apprehended in the subject and then the Invariable Concomitance is apprehended. And this is also the order in which the Invariable Concomitance is apprehended in an external example – in accordance with the theory of ‘external concomitance’.⁷

In this context, the attempt to reduce Dharmakīrti’s ‘syllogism’ to the Aristotelian pattern by adding to the former the Conclusion which it omits⁸ appears misleading – even if one neglects the ‘example’ (*dr̥ṣṭānta*),⁹ and even if one takes into account the fact that in the Aristotelian syllogisms also, the order of the premisses is arbitrary.¹⁰

Ibid., p. 103: *na hy atra kaścīc samayaḥ pratyāyanāvīṣeṣe ’py evam eva śabdāḥ prayuktavyā iti. – Hetubindu* (Steinkellner’s edition : cf. n. 3 above), p. 43 (7*) : *atra pakṣadharmasaṃbandhavadānayaḥ karmaniyamo ’pi na kaścīc, sarvathā gamakatvāt. Also: Pramāṇavārttika IV, 22. – See also Katsumi Mimaki, Blo gsal grub mtha’ (Kyoto 1982), pp. 213-5.*

Theoretically, Dharmakīrti retains only the second and the third members of the ‘five-membered sentence’ of Nyāya, viz., the ‘Reason’ (*hetu*) and the ‘Example’ (*udāharaṇa : dr̥ṣṭānta*), which, according to him, can be expressed in either order – not the third and the fourth members, viz., the ‘Example’ and the ‘Application’ (*upanaya*), since he rejects, along with the ‘Proposition’ (*pratijñā*) and the ‘Conclusion’ (*niḡamana*), the ‘Application’ as well. See also Arcaṭa, *Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 72.

⁶ See K. Bhattacharya, ‘Some Thoughts on Antaryāpti, Bahirvyāpti, and Trairūpya’, in B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 89-105; ‘Marginal Notes on Antaryāpti’, in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Wien, 1991, pp. 1-2.

⁷ *Antaryāptisamarthana*, ed. Y. Kajiyama, Tokyo 1999 (*Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica II*, International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhism, Soka University), pp. 70 ff. Ratnākaraśānti quotes *Pramāṇavārttika IV, 17c-d: śaktasya sūcakaṃ hetuvaco ’śaktam api svayam.*

⁸ Katsumi Mimaki, *La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa) et la preuve de la momentanété des choses (Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi)* [Paris 1976], pp. 48-9.

⁹ *Pramāṇavārttika I (Svārthānumānapariccheda)*, 26 (in R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the Autocommentary : Text and Critical Notes*, Roma 1960), and ‘Some Thoughts on Antaryāpti, Bahirvyāpti, and Trairūpya’, *loc. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

¹⁰ See J. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle’s Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic* (Oxford second edition, 1957), pp. 32-4; C. Patzig, *Aristotle’s Theory of the Syllogism* (English translation of *Die aristotelische Syllogistik*) [Dordrecht, Holland, 1968], pp. 59-61 ; with n. 20. (On ‘the true form of the Aristotelian syllogism’, see further Lukasiewicz, pp. 1 ff., 21; Patzig, pp. 1 ff.; see also I. M. Bocheński, *Formale Logik* [Freiburg / München 1956], p. 509 [concerning the Indian syllogism]. Incidentally, it may be stated that Stcherbatsky’s observation on the order of the members of the syllogism [*Buddhist Logic* (reprint Dover / New York 1962) II, p. 109, n.] are antiquated today).